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The Nature and Management of Myanmar’s 
Alignment with China: The SLORC/SPDC 
Years
Jürgen Haacke 
Abstract: Recent research has focused increasingly on the strategies that 
Southeast Asian countries have adopted vis-à-vis a rising China. This article 
aims to contribute to the literature by discussing Myanmar’s alignment pos-
ture towards China under the post-September 1988 military regime. In par-
ticular, the purpose is to specify and explain the nature and management of 
this alignment. The argument is as follows: first, during the two decades of 
SLORC/SPDC (State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and 
Development Council) rule, Myanmar sought only limited alignment with 
China, focused primarily on diplomatic support and protection, with only a 
moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation. Second, My-
anmar’s alignment with China after 1988 was shaped by at least three im-
portant factors: the core principles of the country’s previous foreign policy 
after colonial rule, a deeply embedded sense of nationalism among the mili-
tary elite, and Burma’s Cold War interaction with China. Third, in managing 
its alignment with China over the last decade, the SPDC avoided compro-
mises perceived as unpalatable in return for the promise of diplomatic pro-
tection and instead ‘rewarded’ Beijing by consenting to economic and infra-
structure projects that were considered to advance the regime’s interest in 
either generating state revenue or contributing to the consolidation and 
expansion of control over state territory. The SPDC also pushed Beijing into 
reconsidering its position on the sensitive issue of armed ethnic groups in 
the Sino-Myanmar border region. The Myanmar case thus shows that lesser 
powers can obtain security benefits from a major power without this neces-
sarily requiring more than limited alignment or entailing a serious erosion of 
political autonomy, particularly when the former possesses valuable natural 
resources and enjoys considerable geo-strategic significance for the latter.  
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Introduction 
A significant amount of research (e.g. Acharya 1999; Goh 2005; Khong 
1999; Kang 2007; Leifer 1999) has now been dedicated to the alignment 
choices and broader national security strategies of the member states of 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Of particular interest has 
been how these countries have positioned themselves vis-à-vis a rising Chi-
na. Increasingly, the consensus is that ASEAN countries have been pursuing 
a so-called hedging strategy (e.g. Kuik 2008; Chung 2004), whereby China is 
engaged on several fronts, primarily by way of economic exchange and di-
plomacy, while the simultaneous pursuit of security and defence relations 
with the United States is intended to provide a safeguard for these countries 
should their relations with China turn sour. This strategy, as pursued by 
ASEAN states towards the major regional powers, has also been described 
as one of multidirectional ‘omni-enmeshment’ and ‘complex balancing’ 
(Goh 2007/8). While hedging is routinely seen as capturing the strategies 
pursued by Southeast Asia states generally and the original ASEAN coun-
tries in particular, scholars have yet to unambiguously conclude and demon-
strate that Myanmar too is pursuing a hedging strategy of the kind men-
tioned above.1 Indeed, there is arguably no consensus within the literature 
on the SLORC/SPDC’s alignment choice vis-à-vis China. Some analysts 
have suggested that Myanmar has been bandwagoning with China in the 
post-1989 period (Roy 2005), and journalists and commentators regularly 
depict Myanmar as a present-day client state or vassal of the PRC (e.g. Aung 
Zaw 2011). Meanwhile, others have pointed to Myanmar’s seemingly con-
sistent efforts to offset China’s influence and role in Myanmar through 
membership in regional frameworks such as ASEAN and by developing 
relations with India (e.g. Haacke 2006).  
This paper2 aims to explore and explain the nature and management of 
Myanmar’s alignment towards China. It is organized into five main sections: 
the first section outlines the conceptual parameters for this paper. The se-
cond section focuses on the nature of the alignment under the recent mili-
tary regime. The third identifies several factors that can account for Myan-
mar’s distinct alignment posture vis-à-vis China from the late 1980s, while 
1  Drawing on its official designation, the article uses Myanmar for the period from 
1989. No political statement is intended. Burma is the preferred designation for the 
period up to 1989. With the 2008 Constitution coming into effect, the country’s of-
ficial designation is now Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 
2  An earlier version was presented at the Association of Asian Studies Conference in 
Honolulu, Hawaii, 31 March-3 April 2011. I am grateful for the helpful comments 
by fellow panellists, especially Anne Booth, as well as Christopher R. Hughes.  
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the fourth section explores how the military government has managed this 
alignment in practice. The last section briefly examines whether Myanmar’s 
new, nominally civilian administration is likely to deviate from the SLORC/ 
SPDC pattern of alignment with China.  
Alignment and Hedging 
Alignments are conventionally considered to constitute state responses to 
perceived security threats posed by other states.3 Some alignments take the 
form of an alliance, but not all do. Snyder (1997: 6) has defined alignment as 
mutual expectations, and, more specifically, ‘as expectations of states about 
whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interac-
tions.’ By comparison, an alliance goes further in that it entails ‘a promise of 
mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states’ (Wolfers 
1968: 268).4 Notably, as Snyder (1991: 125) maintains, alignment should be 
understood to cover both ‘alignment against’ as well as ‘alignment with’ 
someone. This view is reflected in the distinction between (external) balanc-
ing and bandwagoning. The former normally involves a range of steps to 
pool military strength against external power (capabilities) or a shared per-
ceived threat. 5  In contrast, bandwagoning denotes alignment with the 
threatening state (Walt 1987: 21).6 Generally, balancing is considered the 
norm. However, it may be assumed that the weaker a state is that finds itself 
to be threatened, the more likely it is to bandwagon, especially vis-à-vis 
proximate power or threats. Also, while the above definition of alignment 
perhaps suggested that alignments at heart consist of expectations or prom-
ises, the literature clearly holds that alignment should moreover be under-
stood as a form of security practice, albeit one that may involve quite differ-
ent commitments and arrangements (Duffield 2008: 293).  
The growing reliance on ‘hedging’ to categorize the foreign policy and 
security strategies of Southeast Asian countries is linked to numerous schol-
ars decrying the utility of relying on ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ for 
3   According to Walt (1987), the level of threat is affected by four key factors: the 
distribution or asymmetry of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, 
and perceived intentions. 
4   Having initially used a broad definition of alliances, Walt (1997: 157) later suggested 
that ‘the defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for mutual military sup-
port against some external actor(s) in some specified set of circumstances.’
5   Also see works on soft balancing (e.g. Pape 2005), however. 
6   Bandwagoning is also associated with opportunity for gain, i.e. as alignment that 
serves to obtain coveted values (see Schweller 1994).
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analytical purposes.7 Indeed, analysts covering the international relations of 
Southeast Asia tend to see both unadulterated forms of (external) balancing 
and bandwagoning as strategic choices that most decision-makers in South-
east Asia would seek to avoid rather than embrace. This was already appar-
ent in the 1990s, when scholars identified a range of potentially complemen-
tary approaches among Southeast Asian states in response to China’s rise, 
including engagement and domination-avoidance.8 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
recent work associates hedging with economic pragmatism, ‘binding-
engagement’, limited bandwagoning, dominance denial and indirect balanc-
ing combined (Kuik 2008: 165-171). Hedging also captures the prevailing 
strategic flux and accompanying risks.  
This article agrees that the complexity of strategies developing states 
will adopt vis-à-vis major powers may well not be adequately captured when 
conceiving alignment choices simply as balancing or bandwagoning. Like-
wise, however, it is not yet clear that the various facets of such strategies are 
necessarily better understood as hedging. First, alignment choices extend 
beyond balancing, bandwagoning and hedging. Such other choices may 
include nonalignment. While taking into account that declaratory policy may 
of course diverge from policy practice, it is noteworthy that several countries 
in Southeast Asia, including Myanmar, purport to be nonaligned. When 
trying to ascertain and analyse the alignment choice of a country towards 
another, it thus makes sense to avoid unnecessary theoretical or conceptual 
constraints. Second, whether states can be said to hedge in practice will 
depend on whether their substantive foreign policy conforms with the sup-
positions associated with hedging. In this regard, there is the apparent diffi-
culty that there would not appear to be a consensus definition of hedging. 
For some, hedging denotes a strategy against hegemonic domination in the 
context of strategic uncertainty (Roy 2005: 306; also see Medeiros 2005/6). 
For others, hedging involves  
a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) 
a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward 
alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.9  
7  Not least for these reasons, the category can of course also be applied beyond 
Southeast Asia. See, for instance, Foot 2006. 
8  See the contributions in Johnston and Ross 1999.
9  Goh 2005: 2. In her assessment (Goh 2007/8: 121, 132, 139) Southeast Asian 
countries are not simply ‘hedging their bets’, however, but committed to forging a 
regional balance of influence to bring about a preferred vision of regional order 
which ‘blatantly favors U.S. preponderance.’ 
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Identifying both risk-contingency options (e.g. indirect balancing) and re-
turn-maximising options (e.g economic engagement) as elements of a hedg-
ing strategy, Kuik has suggested that hedging should be understood as  
a behaviour in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing mul-
tiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteract-
ing effects, under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes 
(Kuik 2008: 163). 
John Ciorciari (2007: 11) has argued that hedging  
refers more specifically to attempts by developing countries to avoid 
alignments that require their support for a great power’s armed strug-
gle, bind them to particular foreign policy positions, or grant the great 
power permanent basing facilities.  
It would moreover appear that even in the case of what is arguably one of 
the most sophisticated attempts yet to think about hedging, ambiguity re-
mains regarding the specific conditions that would apparently need to be 
met for hedging to occur. As noted, Kuik (2008: 163) has suggested that 
hedging will prevail only ‘under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-
stakes’. Kuik (2008: 165) has sought to clarify by adding that hedging is 
possible only if three conditions are met: a) the absence of an immediate 
threat, b) the absence of any ideological fault lines, and c) the absence of an 
all-out Great Power rivalry. Yet when these situations of high-uncertainties 
and high-stakes apply may not be entirely straightforward to ascertain. 
Whose perspective matters? Should high uncertainty necessarily be equated, 
as Kuik suggests, with situations in which states face no unambiguous 
threats or do not benefit from significant levels of amity in their bilateral 
relations with a particular power? Likewise, do high stakes only pertain when 
questions of state survival arise? While there is a benefit in delimiting hedg-
ing as an alignment choice, the variation in its meaning, albeit perhaps only 
slight in some cases, and the specific circumstances attached to the concept 
by some, raise questions about the value of making hedging an alternative 
starting point for the analysis of the alignment choices of states. In contrast, 
the alignment literature more generally is clearly not as significantly affected 
by definitional issues, nor bound by the specific conditions associated with 
hedging (see below).  
Second, while hedging can be applied to describe the approach to a 
particular bilateral relationship, its invocation in studies relating to the for-
eign policy of Southeast Asian states confirms that it is mostly used and 
meant to cover the strategies adopted vis-à-vis the two key powers affecting 
stability and peace in the region: the US and China. Interestingly, the nature 
and scope of security and defence relations that ASEAN countries have 
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with the United States barely seem to matter though, raising the question 
whether at least some of those who posit that ASEAN states engage in 
hedging behaviour possibly pack too much into the category. As Ciorciari 
argued, the hedging literature  
is not specific enough about the relationship between broad hedging 
strategies and security alignments [... so that the] the concept is not 
terribly useful in helping illuminate the nuances in alignment politics 
(Ciorciari 2010: 7). 
As such, by focusing on hedging, analysts may lose sight of important other 
questions, especially regarding (1) the nature of particular alignments, and (2) 
the political dynamics underlying their management. These issues will form 
the focus of this paper on Myanmar’s alignment with China.  
Third, those arguing that hedging best encapsulates the strategies of 
Southeast Asian states have to date tended not to focus in much detail on 
the Myanmar case.10 To be sure, scholars might still want to conclude that 
under the SLORC/SPDC Myanmar too was hedging, but it is important to 
recall that while ASEAN’s strategies toward China are said to generally pin-
point a preference for a US led regional order, the reality for the SLORC/ 
SPDC regime was that it had to deal with a rising China in the context of 
very difficult relations with Washington. Indeed, the post-1988 military 
leadership viewed the United States through the prism of regime and na-
tional security because Washington consistently demanded political change 
from SLORC/SPDC and offered unwavering support for Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (Steinberg 2010). Myan-
mar’s generals even considered possible until quite recently American mili-
tary intervention (Selth 2008). Washington’s approach toward Naypyidaw 
only recently shifted slightly when, following an extensive Burma policy 
review, the incoming Obama administration opted in September 2009 to 
also apply vis-à-vis Than Shwe’s regime its generally preferred foreign policy 
approach of pragmatic engagement. Myanmar’s ties with Washington during 
SLORC/SPDC rule thus were for the most part notably different from 
those enjoyed for long by all other ASEAN members. What role the US 
may have played in Myanmar’s grand strategy under the last military regime 
(especially after 2008) should be the subject of a fuller assessment that will 
not be undertaken here. Notably, hedging might also not really capture My-
anmar’s specific relationship with China, especially given the standard no-
tion that it assumes the economic and diplomatic engagement of the PRC 
but no substantial promises relating to security or defence. Here, the focus is 
only the nature and management of Myanmar’s alignment vis-à-vis China. 
10  For an exception, see Ciorciari 2007 and 2010: 176-182. 
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Drawing on the alignment literature, the article’s parameters are set by three 
basic points. 
First, alignments differ. Ciorciari (2010), for instance, usefully distin-
guishes among three kinds of alignments: tight alignments, limited align-
ments, and nonalignment. As noted, alignments diverge concerning the 
extent to which states are expected and do provide support that will enhance 
the security of other states. Promises and expectations of support will often 
be mutual, but need not always be. Tight alignment is associated with mili-
tary alliances. Less far reaching promises and support suggest that only lim-
ited alignment is in place. In contrast to limited alignment, genuine nona-
lignment may be associated with the deliberate absence of promises and 
expectations concerning various forms of support and related action. De-
veloping countries, including those in Southeast Asia, are believed to prefer 
limited alignments (Ciorciari 2010). These may involve various forms of 
practical cooperation designed to strengthen their security, including the 
transfer of defence capabilities. Limited alignments may involve preferential 
arms sales, joint training exercises, or (possibly commercial) access to mili-
tary facilities or logistical and technical assistance (Ciorciari 2010: 8). Limited 
alignments might also involve the routine exchange of military intelligence 
or industrial defence cooperation. Limited alignment can also be associated 
with expectations of crucial diplomatic support that will help protect the 
state (and the incumbent regime) against perceived threats. Those adopting a 
broad definition of alignment will probably also regard promises of econom-
ic support (e.g. financial aid, access to technology, possibilities for enrich-
ment) and their delivery as suitable indicators of limited alignment. 
Second, Snyder (1991) posits that alignments, which he suggests will ul-
timately be negotiated, are shaped by strength or power inequalities, past 
interaction between the states concerned, as well as conflicts and common 
interests among them. While these factors are bound to be relevant in ana-
lysing the nature of alignments, here I identify, in part drawing on other 
recent scholarship,11 three to some extent related factors that seem particu-
larly relevant when decision-makers in lesser states pass judgement on the 
preferred nature of their alignment with larger powers: the strength of elite 
and popular nationalism, the availability of other sources of protection and 
assistance, and previous patterns of enmity and amity. How would these 
factors effect the nature of said alignments? The general expectation would 
probably be that the more pervasive and strong the nationalist outlook and 
perhaps consequently also the deeper the political commitment to nona-
11  For a discussion of the influences on alignments involving developing states, see 
Ciorciari 2010: Chapter 1.
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lignment, the more likely it is that any actual alignment entered into will also 
be limited. Also, the more possibilities exist for the lesser state to address 
perceived security threats by potentially relying on support from third states, 
the more likely that the alignment will not be particularly close. Equally, one 
should expect the alignment to be limited if there is a substantial record of 
historical suspicion and conflict between the two states.  
Third, concerning the management of alignments the literature has 
pointed in particular to the risks of abandonment and entrapment (Snyder 
1997). While states bound together in close-knit alignments seem particular-
ly exposed to these risks, less powerful states benefiting from limited align-
ment with major powers are also vulnerable, especially if the major power in 
question has to decide between its wider regional or global interests and 
support for a particular lesser state. A common notion concerning asymmet-
ric tight alignments is also that to avoid the abandonment by the major 
power and to secure stable support, decision-makers of the lesser power are 
prepared to pay a political price that may involve sacrificing certain aspects 
of its political autonomy (e.g. Morrow 1991), i.e. the ability to determine and 
pursue their own respective policies towards both the domestic and external 
realms. In practice, this could take the form of greater support of specific 
objectives and policies pursued by the major power, or various other con-
cessions pertaining to domestic policies. This trade off should to some ex-
tent also be expected in more limited alignments. It is also possible that the 
political price for non-abandonment in a limited alignment is the intensifica-
tion of the bilateral relationship itself, including concerning practical security 
and defence cooperation. However, the risk of abandonment in a limited 
alignment is likely to be less severe if the minor power is also able to rely on 
support from other states, especially other major powers, in ways that do 
not undermine its security. Particularly without alternative sources of sup-
port, one would under most conditions not expect the lesser state to seri-
ously challenge the major power with which it is aligned, even if the align-
ment is only limited. In so far as economic assistance is an important feature 
of an alignment relationship, the general rationalist expectation is that:  
aid is most likely to create reliable proxies when the recipients are so 
vulnerable and dependent that they are forced to follow the patron’s 
wishes even when those wishes conflict with their own (Walt 
1987: 45). 
However, Walt’s finding concerning the Middle East, based in part on the 
very moderate Soviet influence over states such as Egypt or Syria during the 
Cold War, was that more aid made available by the major power to the mi-
nor power does not automatically translate into political leverage for the 
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former. This insight may be equally relevant for more limited alignments in 
other regions. 
The SLORC/SPDC Alignment with China
As seen by the military regime that came to power in September 1988, the 
army had that year come close to losing control of the state as leftist radicals 
and neo-imperialist foreign forces, apparently intent on breaking up Burma, 
had sought to exploit the unfolding political unrest (Taylor 2009: 395). The 
incoming military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, 
assumed control to defend the country’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
unity. In foreign affairs, the SLORC abandoned the strong isolationist streak 
that characterized the Ne Win years. In particular, the regime was soon 
adjudged to have formed very close links with China. According to Johan 
Malik (1998: 109), the military junta after 1988 ‘abandoned the traditional 
policy of political equidistance between China and India’, becoming ‘a pup-
pet of China as well as a base for future Chinese military operations, thus 
upsetting the regional balance of power.’ He also argued that China and 
Myanmar had formed a ‘de facto military alliance’ (Malik 1998: 113). Writing 
several years later, Storey (2011: 84) also takes SPDC-run Myanmar to be ‘a 
quasi-ally of the PRC.’ Other analysts have similarly posited that bilateral 
rapprochement between Yangon and Beijing in the late 1980s yielded a 
‘Sino-Burmese military entente’ (Egreteau 2003: 97), or at least the ‘closest 
ever’ relationship between the two sides (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). 
Scholars note varying reasons why the SLORC developed ties with China. 
As Ciorciari (2010: 179), for instance, put it: Myanmar’s ‘desperate need for 
aid was perhaps the decisive factor that propelled Myanmar into a much 
closer alignment with China.’ Others emphasize the SLORC’s fears of US 
military intervention after 1988 (e.g. Selth 2002: 40-41). 
Assessment of Myanmar-China relations positing a de facto military al-
liance between Beijing and Yangon have to large extent built on two devel-
opments: first, the major SLORC arms purchases from China in the early 
1990s, which allowed the Burmese military to improve both its conventional 
defence capability and its ability to conduct anti-insurgency operations; and, 
second, China’s apparent role not only in modernizing or constructing mili-
tary facilities, but also in winning access to physical infrastructure. More 
specifically, analysts for years focused on alleged Chinese bases and intelli-
gence gathering activities aimed at India, especially on Hainggyi Island (in 
the Irrawaddy) and Great Coco Island in the Adaman Sea.  
Retrospectively, the case for propounding a close-knit alignment by the 
early or mid 1990s, or indeed later, seems relatively weak. Explicit significant 
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defence commitments or security guarantees, both unilateral and mutual, are 
not on public record for the period of SLORC/SPDC rule and cannot be 
assumed to have existed. Instead, the two countries emphasize regularly the 
special nature of the so-called ‘paukphaw’ relationship, which is framed by a 
declaratory commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Of 
course, tight alignment might also rest on secret understandings, especially if 
these were flanked by substantial practical defence cooperation. However, 
actual Myanmar-China defence cooperation, even in the early 1990s, would 
appear to have been far less significant than is often assumed. Certainly, 
both governments consistently issued denials concerning suggestions that 
there were Chinese bases in Myanmar. Analysts too have concluded that 
Chinese bases in Myanmar amount to a myth, while also suggesting that 
even the level of presumed intelligence gathering and sharing between My-
anmar and the PRC may for long have been grossly exaggerated (Selth 2007). 
This finding rests not least on the point that as Myanmar’s relations with 
New Delhi improved from the mid-1990s, suspicions and allegations initially 
put forward over many years by various Indian sources regarding a Chinese 
military presence in Myanmar were voiced less frequently and ultimately 
retracted in 2005 by India’s Chief of Naval Staff.  
How far-reaching was Myanmar-China post-Cold War defence cooper-
ation during the SLORC/SPRC years? While its full extent is possibly not 
captured by some of the literature, the latter does not yield significant evi-
dence that would immediately point to more than limited alignment between 
the two countries during this time. Bilateral exchanges on defence matters of 
course took place on many occasions, but Beijing and Naypyidaw apparently 
did not initiate the kind of annual defence dialogue that the PRC started 
with Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore between 2001 and 
2006 (Storey 2011: 73). Similarly, China conducted military education and 
training for members of the Tatmadaw, much of which was tied to arms 
acquisitions, but more substantial practical cooperation, such as military 
exercises, as Beijing has recently organized with Thailand, for instance, was 
apparently not undertaken with Myanmar under Senior General Than 
Shwe’s leadership. It was also not before August/September 2010 that what 
was said to be the first official port call by Chinese warships occurred, as 
two PLAN ships stopped for a five-day visit at Thilawa Port on their return 
from international operations off Somalia (Xinhua 2010). The two sides also 
did not engage in joint security operations that would be comparable to 
Myanmar’s counter insurgency activities with India (Egreteau 2008). That 
said, China and Myanmar did conclude a Frontier Defence Cooperation 
Agreement, and cooperated regarding some nontraditional security challeng-
es, not least the flow of drugs from northern Myanmar into China (Chin 
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2009). Interestingly, compared with the quite substantial outlay for military 
equipment in the early 1990s, Myanmar’s arms acquisitions from the PRC 
also declined quite significantly in the last decade. Myanmar accounted for 
65 per cent of PRC arms sales to Southeast Asia in the 2000-2009 period, 
which amounted to only USD 316 million in total (Storey 2011: 74). The 
decision by SLORC/SPDC to acquire far fewer military platforms from 
China after the mid-1990s than before stemmed partly from concerns about 
the quality of earlier acquisitions, but seems to have also been influenced by 
political considerations. Overall, therefore, the extent of Sino-Myanmar 
military cooperation was almost certainly much more circumscribed than 
was generally assumed at the time, seemingly with no specific defence and 
security commitments beyond those linked to managing security in the fron-
tier area.  
While not having sought tight alignment with Beijing, the SLORC/ 
SPDC regime relied on significant support from China. Most of this support 
took the forms of diplomatic backing, although economic assistance should 
not be overlooked. More specifically, facing widespread international criti-
cisms for its poor record on human rights and governance, the SPDC bene-
fited after 1989 from a measure of diplomatic protection offered by China in 
various international organizations. When the perceived need for such dip-
lomatic protection became more urgent after political pressure on the mili-
tary junta increased conspicuously after the SPDC again detained Aung San 
Suu Kyi in May 2003, China continued to stand behind Myanmar. Though 
Western countries were ultimately successful in placing Myanmar on the 
agenda of the UN Security Council, Beijing (and Moscow) decisively 
blocked a draft resolution on the situation in Myanmar in January 2007. 
Before the vote, Myanmar officials were confident they would be able to 
count on China (Interview, Yangon, November 2006). Myanmar’s leader-
ship has therefore gratefully referred to the relationship with China as its 
‘closest and most important diplomatic relationship’ (People’s Daily Online 
2011). Notably, given that Myanmar remained cut off from the financial and 
technical assistance usually available from international financial institutions 
and could not rely for such assistance on other regional countries, the mili-
tary government sought to advance economic cooperation with China, in 
part by drawing on the latter’s concessionary loans and technical expertise to 
proceed with often large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects that the 
regime was unable to get off the ground itself (see Storey 2011: 145-164). In 
the 2000s, mining, hydropower and energy exploration thus became major 
sectors of bilateral cooperation. Indeed, recent official data indicated that 
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the PRC has emerged as Myanmar’s largest foreign investor.12 The econom-
ic interdependence between China and Myanmar was thus significantly 
strengthened during SLORC/SPDC rule. Significantly, however, strong 
economic links should not per se be equated with tight alignment between 
countries.  
Accounting for the Limits of Myanmar-China 
Alignment
Several factors can account for the limited or loose alignment that devel-
oped between Myanmar and China after 1988. One is the country’s security 
environment at the time. Indeed, from the junta’s perspective, Burma’s 
broader external security environment deteriorated because of the military’s 
bloody suppression of the 1988 protests. The presence of American navy 
vessels off the country’s shores had led to fears about a possible direct in-
tervention. Invasion by proxy was also a scenario in view of the apparent 
closing of ranks between domestic insurgents and foreign powers. As 
Maung Aung Myoe (2009: 33) argued:  
The regime was also concerned that foreign powers might help insur-
gents on the Myanmar border to develop formidable armed forces 
that would challenge the new regime in Yangon. Moreover, the 
Tatmadaw leadership believed that various political organizations that 
proliferated in the post-1988 political upheaval and military takeover 
had actively sought foreign assistance, in the form of interference or 
intervention, to destabilize or overthrow the incumbent regime. 
In the event, however, the military junta concluded that the insurgencies in 
the border regions with Thailand in particular constituted the primary secu-
rity threat and as such the calculation was that in the de facto absence of 
support from other quarters the SLORC would want to foremost rely on 
China to build up its military capabilities. This assessment prevailed for 
some years, vindicated perhaps because the counter insurgency campaign in 
the early to mid-1990s largely depleted the military strength of those armed 
groups that were unwilling to agree to ceasefires. One could thus argue that 
tight alignment was probably not considered necessary given the particular 
security situation even if it had been available.13 To be sure, external security 
12  According to official Chinese figures, bilateral trade has jumped to USD 4.4 billion 
in 2010. 
13  China has abjured alliances. Its only remaining alliance dating back to the Cold War 
is the 1961 China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. 
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pressures mounted over time, as Washington in particular sought to influ-
ence Myanmar’s political processes and future, raising questions for the 
military junta about whether and how to adjust and manage its alignment 
with China (see below). Meanwhile, other factors also suggest that more 
than loose alignment was not deemed desirable.  
Foreign Policy Legacy
Burma’s longstanding commitment to nonalignment also seems to have 
decisively affected the SLORC’s preferences concerning the political bound-
aries within which to reorient the country’s foreign policy. After all, upon 
Burma becoming independent, then Prime Minister U Nu had already pur-
sued an independent foreign policy that was to be free from ‘entangling 
military or political alignments or alliances with the cold war contestants’ 
(Johnstone 1963: 286). Burma subscribed for years to a foreign policy that 
emphasized ‘friendly relations with all nations’ and a preparedness to accept 
economic assistance only if Burma’s sovereignty was not infringed (see 
Johnstone 1963). Among others, two major rationales underpinned the 
preference for nonalignment: first, the pursuit of security from external 
aggression and intervention, and, second, the demands of state and nation-
building.14 With Burma having been a major theatre of war during the Se-
cond World War, U Nu and other leaders sought to forestall Burma again 
becoming the battle ground in a confrontation between the major opposing 
powers. The newly independent Burma also had to address serious ideologi-
cal differences and ethnic conflict in order for state control to expand and 
nation-building to begin.  
The value ascribed to an independent foreign policy by Burmese lead-
ers until 1989 despite generally trying circumstances was consistent and 
resolute. Under U Nu the commitment to an independent foreign policy 
was second to no other foreign policy principle, although in practice it was 
soon paired with a special relationship with the People’s Republic, based on 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. This served to address Ran-
goon’s fears that the unwanted KMT-presence in Shan State might lead to 
PRC intervention. As Michael Leifer (1974: 29) argued, in Burma’s case ‘a 
policy of firm adherence to the defence of independence was combined, 
where necessary, with an expedient accommodation to safeguard that inde-
pendence.’ The extent to which such accommodation with China was con-
14  Johnstone (1963: 240-248) also identifies other reasons, including the influence of 
Buddhism, the ideological orientation of the ruling party, the Anti-Fascist People’s 
Freedom League (AFPFL), anti-colonialism (see below), and Moscow’s confronta-
tional approach towards the incoming U Nu government. 
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sidered compatible with nonalignment became clear when Burma’s 1960 
border agreement with the PRC was followed by a bilateral Treaty of 
Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression. At the time, some scholars inter-
preted this move as a sign of deference, while Tinker (1967: 378) even ar-
gued that ‘the embrace of the Elder Brother has become almost suffocating.’ 
From a Burmese perspective, however, the treaty did not imply any change 
to its nonaligned foreign policy. In 1961, the year in which U Thant was 
elected to the post of Secretary General of the United Nations, Burma’s 
commitment to an independent foreign policy was manifestly demonstrated 
by the country joining the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a founding 
member. Significantly, Burma’s nonaligned policy was also maintained when 
Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council ended the country’s initial democratic ex-
perience and assumed power by coup d’état in 1962. During the 1960s and 
1970s, Rangoon’s independent foreign policy in practice amounted to a high 
degree of self-imposed isolation. Still under Ne Win, Burma distinguished 
itself by withdrawing from NAM at the 1979 Summit in Havanna (Misra 
1981), as the then ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party remained com-
mitted to an ‘independent and active foreign policy’.  
Given four decades of strong commitment to nonalignment by the 
country’s elite in both declaratory and practical terms even in challenging 
times, the incoming SLORC regime should not have been expected to 
abandon the country’s core commitment to an independent foreign policy 
even if it did decide, in the context of strong Western criticism and pressure, 
to end the more isolationist aspects of the country’s foreign policy in favour 
of some measure of regional integration. In the event, the SLORC outlined 
among its foreign policy principles the following:  
maintaining friendly relations with all nations and good relations with 
neighbouring countries in particular; the pursuit of mutually beneficial 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation programmes; opposition to im-
perialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, interference, aggression and 
domination of one state by another; and the creation of equitable 
economic conditions (Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  
Notably, government publications clearly highlighted that Myanmar could 
be ‘everyone’s friend but still no one’s ally’ (Hla Min 2004: 44).  
Nationalistic Outlook of the Military Leadership 
The continued pursuit of an independent foreign policy by the SLORC/ 
SPDC has without question hinged not merely on the political legacy of 
previous governments, but also on the preferences of the military leadership. 
In the post-1988 period, military leaders propounded an official ideology 
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that focused foremost on national sovereignty, territorial integrity and ‘na-
tional reconsolidation.’ This was pursued under Senior General Than Shwe 
with steely determination in the face of numerous political challenges, in-
cluding external security concerns as well as continued problematic relations 
with armed ethnic groups. Foreigners have generally been viewed with sus-
picion by the SLORC/SPDC leadership and the former period of colonial 
subjugation is understood as a historical aberration, whose reoccurrence is 
to be avoided at all costs. Indeed, Senior General Than Shwe, who assumed 
the reigns of power in 1992, has been portrayed as a ‘psychological warrior’ 
who is interested not only in the defence of Myanmar’s independence but 
also has pretensions to be a modern-day emperor (Rogers 2010; Steinberg 
2009). This worldview is naturally incompatible with tight alignment that 
might give outsiders undue influence over Myanmar’s political affairs. Signif-
icantly, it was not only Than Shwe’s personal worldview that underpinned 
Myanmar’s commitment to an independent foreign policy in the 1990s and 
beyond. In the words of Pedersen (2008), ‘[t]he military leaders perceive it to 
be their national and professional duty to counter any form of external in-
fluence, not just politically, but also in the economic, social, and cultural 
spheres.’ Or, in the words of Hla Min (2004: 151), ‘[a]s a sovereign inde-
pendent country we do not like to be pushed around.’ This attitude has 
probably been most conspicuous in the regime’s reactions to Western criti-
cisms as well as advice, but it applies more generally. As such, the keen na-
tionalism of Burman post-independence leaders has been carried over into 
the more recent period, in part as a result of socialization of military officers.  
Post-independence Relationship with China  
While taking advantage of the PRC’s willingness to strengthen the military 
regime by way of arms sales and taking advantage of Beijing’s diplomatic 
support, the SLORC/SPDC’s preference for only limited alignment with 
China even when confronting a challenging external security environment 
associated with US pressure should not entirely surprise given Burma’s 
complex and at times very difficult relationship with the People’s Republic 
after independence. During the early years of independence the U Nu gov-
ernment faced Chinese communist subversion. Though the two countries 
soon nevertheless managed to maintain friendly relations, based on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Rangoon government faced further 
security challenges from China, including serious incursions by Chinese 
troops in 1956 into Wa state in Burma’s northeast against the backdrop of 
competing territorial claims concerning the border and the presence of 
KMT troops in Shan State. At the time, the incursions raised important 
questions about China’s commitment to the principles said to underpin 
 120 Jürgen Haacke 
bilateral ties. In the event, U Nu, in his capacity as President of Burma’s 
Anti Fascist People’s Freedom League, in September 1956, reached agree-
ment in principle with Chinese leaders regarding the border dispute. The 
settlement of the border dispute in January 1960 fell to the then head of the 
caretaker government, General Ne Win. This briefly lifted relations to a new 
high; and Burma allowed PLA troops to cross over the border to militarily 
oust remaining KMT forces, seemingly in return for the favourable border 
settlement.  
However, further to strains over the exodus of Chinese resulting from 
policies adopted in the wake of the formation of the Revolutionary Council 
in 1962, the latter’s relations with China dipped as the politics and popular 
excitement of the Cultural Revolution spilled over the border. In response, 
anti-Chinese riots occurred in Burma in 1967. These led to a breakdown in 
ties, and Beijing subsequently provided considerable material as well as 
manpower support for the Communist Party of Burma, leading in early 1968 
to what Thant Myint-U (2011: 52) suggested was ‘nothing less than an inva-
sion from China.’ China’s support indeed allowed the CPB to stage what 
was arguably the most significant insurgency organized against the Ne Win 
regime at the time. Burma did normalize relations with the People’s Repub-
lic again in the early 1970s, but correct diplomatic ties continued to be over-
shadowed for a number of years by Beijing’s continued links with and sup-
port for the CPB, though the latter declined over time. Fighting the CPB 
resulted in heavy loss of life for the Tatmadaw. By some accounts (Smith 
1999: 255) the CPB’s forces, consisting in large measure of ethnic minority 
troops, killed and wounded more than 11,000 Burmese army personnel 
between 1968 and 1973.  
Significant sacrifices continued also to be made by the Tatmadaw 
throughout the 1970s into the early 1980s. Notably, a major CPB assault on 
government-controlled town, Mong Yang, still occurred in September 1988 
after the SLORC assumed power, leading to heavy casualties on both sides, 
and with the CPB leadership vowing to overthrow the SLORC, its fighters 
subsequently conducted ‘one of the most savage blood-baths in CPB’s 40 
year-insurrection’ in December that year (Smith 1999: 374). Numerous mili-
tary leaders engaged the CPB at some point in their military career, and it 
seems that the role China played in reinforcing and then sustaining the CPB 
insurgency forms an important aspect of their collective memory. China 
offered sanctuary to Burman communist cadres once the CPB succumbed 
to mutinies in the spring of 1989. In view of these experiences, a bilateral 
arrangement that would have involved tight military alignment even in the 
context of a more fundamental re-calibration of Western and Japanese poli-
cy toward Yangon would probably have been difficult to contemplate. The 
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following section examines how the military regime has managed its political 
alignment with the PRC in more recent years.  
Managing the Alignment with China: The SPDC 
Years
Scholars and commentators analysing the developments of the early to mid-
1990s suggested that Myanmar would have to pay a hefty price for access to 
China’s military hardware and its diplomatic and economic support, possibly 
as political subservience or economic domination. This conforms to expec-
tations that in an alignment relationship greater security for less powerful 
countries may come at the expense of political autonomy. At the worst, as 
Malik (1998: 130) surmised, ‘Beijing could even threaten to resume assis-
tance to ethnic insurgents fighting for independence on the Sino-Burmese 
border.’ Significantly, Myanmar’s perceived wider security environment 
evolved for the worse within a few years of the SLORC rebranding itself as 
the SPDC in 1997 because the lack of domestic political change at the time, 
not least the absence of a political process involving Aung San Suu Kyi and 
the country’s very problematic human rights record, led to increased de 
facto demands for regime change by Western countries. While bilateral ties 
with the US under President Clinton were hardly good, relations with Wash-
ington suffered significantly when George W. Bush assumed the presidency. 
Increasingly, the SPDC also came under more severe diplomatic pressure 
from various quarters within international society as it only slowly imple-
mented its roadmap to democracy, announced in August 2003 in response 
to the Depayin incident. By the mid-2000s there was a distinct possibility of 
the US and other critics of the SPDC successfully passing a UNSC resolu-
tion against Myanmar unless China or Russia would block relevant diplo-
matic efforts.  
Against this backdrop the question is how successful Myanmar has 
been in safeguarding its ability to make autonomous decisions regarding 
core domestic priorities and manage in line with its basic foreign policy 
principles Naypyidaw’s alignment with China. Despite greater dependence 
on Beijing’s willingness to protect Myanmar diplomatically, there is interest-
ingly hardly much evidence to suggest that the SPDC compromised its polit-
ical autonomy in significant ways. Key domestic political decisions taken by 
the SPDC leadership do not seem to have even been raised by them with 
China, let alone discussed. One concerns the removal in 2004 of former 
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who was said to be well connected with Beijing. 
Another is the rather expensive relocation of the country’s capital to 
Naypyidaw in November 2005, which is also said to have surprised China’s 
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government. Of course, what might still apply to the period before 2007, the 
year when China did veto a non-punitive UNSC draft resolution on Myan-
mar, might not be true for the last years of SPDC rule. After all, some ob-
servers hold that Myanmar’s political independence has been increasingly 
compromised by Naypyidaw’s reliance on Chinese support. As former intel-
ligence officer and diplomat Aung Linn Htut (2011) has for instance sug-
gested, the present leaders ‘are now in a position to only follow whatever 
Beijing asks them to do.’ While the past is not always a guide for the future, 
there is however some evidence that the SPDC generally only rewarded 
China if this suited its economic objectives and actually resisted Beijing on 
multiple occasions in the process of managing its diplomatic alignment.  
Diplomatic Support in Return for Greater Energy 
Security?
Given that it lies at the crossroads between South Asia, Southeast Asia and 
the wider East Asia with a long coastline opening up to the Bay of Bengal 
and Andaman Sea, Chinese decision-makers have regarded Myanmar as a 
country of considerable geostrategic as well as geoeconomic significance and 
business opportunity. Beyond seeing Myanmar as a country that can provide 
major landlocked parts of China’s southwest with access to the Indian 
Ocean, Chinese officials are also keen to exploit its rich deposits of natural 
resources to further the PRC’s economic development and energy security. 
There is a widespread assumption that a connection exists between the 
PRC providing crucial diplomatic protection and the SPDC handing key 
contracts to Chinese state companies. In particular, it is believed that My-
anmar’s authorities made available substantial offshore natural gas reserves 
in return for Chinese support at the UNSC. Certainly, Myanmar was report-
ed to have signed a gas export MoU in January 2006 with PetroChina that 
covered most of the estimated reserves in offshore block A-1 although a 
previous such understanding already existed with an Indian state-owned gas 
utility (Dutta 2006). This followed initial briefings and discussions at the 
UNSC, where the situation in Myanmar was subsequently successfully 
placed on the formal agenda by vote in September 2006. As noted already, 
Beijing, alongside Moscow, then vetoed in January 2007 a UNSC draft reso-
lution on Myanmar which had been sponsored by Washington and London. 
Within days, CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation), China’s larg-
est gas and oil producer and supplier, entered into a contract with Myanmar 
Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and acquired oil and gas exploration and 
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exploitation licences for three deep water blocks in offshore Rakhine (AD-1, 
AD-6, AD-8).15 It was apparently only in June 2008 that representatives of 
CNPC, MOGE, and the Daewoo International led international consortium 
with a stake in Myanmar’s offshore blocks A-1 and A-3 signed a MoU on 
the sale and transportation of natural gas to China. However, earlier reports 
(e.g. Times of India 2007) indicated that Indian delegations to Myanmar had 
already in March 2007 learnt about Naypyidaw having concluded a MoU 
with CNPC’s listed arm, PetroChina, to export these reserves to China ra-
ther than India or Korea, apparently at a lower price than advocated by 
Daewoo International as the consortium leader of the fields’ operator. The 
decision to sell the gas to China could not be reversed by India despite re-
ported promises to provide soft loans and to construct a power plant 
(Lundholm 2007), leaving Daewoo International to pick the state-owned 
CNPC as the preferred bidder (Park and Goswami 2007).  
Beyond opting for the export of natural gas by pipeline to China, My-
anmar’s authorities also approved the construction of a parallel crude oil 
pipeline that was originally proposed by Chinese academics to address the 
PRC’s so-called Malacca Dilemma and subsequently championed for eco-
nomic and political reasons by Yunnan’s provincial government. 16  This 
crude oil pipeline, also to enter China at the border city of Ruili, will allow 
China to re-route some of the oil imports from Africa and the Middle East 
(Saudi Arabia), possibly about one-tenth of current import levels given an 
estimated annual pipeline capacity of 22 million tonnes of crude oil. In De-
cember 2009, Myanmar’s Ministry for Energy and CNPC signed an agree-
ment awarding exclusive rights to the Chinese enterprise to build and oper-
ate the crude oil pipeline (China Daily 2009). The project includes provision 
for associated infrastructure, such as an oil terminal and oil berth. Construc-
tion of suitable port facilities on Manday Island (Kyaukpyu township) ap-
parently began in late October 2009. The construction of the crude oil and 
natural gas pipelines, as well as a refinery in Yunnan, followed.  
While the timing of these decisions regarding the award of exploration 
and exploitation contracts and the sale of natural gas from the Shwe, 
Shwephyu and Mya fields points to their political function, the SPDC re-
gime does not generally appear to have entered into agreements on the basis 
that China should be compensated to Myanmar’s disadvantage. Instead, the 
military has opted for agreements adjudged to serve the country’s political 
15   See CNPC in Myanmar, undated, online: <http://www.cnpc.com.cn/eng/cnpc 
worldwide/asiaandpacific/Burma/>. 
16   The crude oil pipeline reportedly is 771 km, the natural gas pipeline 793 km long 
before they reach Yunnan. The natural gas pipeline broke ground in Myanmar in 
August 2011; the project is due to be completed in 2013. 
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strategic as well as economic interests. For instance, the proposed transit of 
crude oil and the gas exports from the Bay of Bengal by pipeline will con-
siderably reinforce the interdependence between the two countries rather 
than accentuate Myanmar’s pronounced reliance on the PRC for loans, 
investment and expertise. Indeed, transit countries generally gain some 
measure of strategic leverage over destination countries, which Naypyidaw 
will have welcomed. For the SPDC, the export of natural gas to China rather 
than India, which in part was attributable to New Delhi’s inability to act 
decisively in good time, was also in Myanmar’s immediate and longer-term 
economic interests. China was always more likely to rapidly implement the 
project. Moreover, the export of the gas will significantly add to existing 
state revenue. Transit payments to be raised by Myanmar for the pipelines 
are also estimated to be worth at least nine figures, and may amount to USD 
1 billion per annum (Bo Kong 2010: 64). In addition, the gas is to be partly 
tapped for domestic consumption in Myanmar (China Daily 2008), and pric-
es may be re-negotiated regularly, possibly on a quarterly basis.  
The SPDC also ensured that the state oil and gas companies from other 
countries know that they continue to be welcome in further exploring and 
harnessing Myanmar’s hydrocarbon reserves. Although it is too early to 
know how the various physical infrastructure projects will shape Naypyi-
daw’s future ties with the ethnic nationalities, it would appear that the mili-
tary leadership also estimated their likely effect on stability to be positive in 
so far as such infrastructure could be considered useful for a further expan-
sion and/or tightening of state control over the territory traversed. This 
logic may also apply to the planned railway that is in future supposed to 
connect Yunnan with the Bay of Bengal. That said, Myanmar’s military 
clearly discriminated between those projects of strategic significance that it 
found to serve mutual interest and those that were ultimately deemed politi-
cally unpalatable. For instance, the SPDC procrastinated on following 
through with an initial agreement regarding a multi-modal (land and water) 
transport route crossing Myanmar. This project involved the dredging of the 
Irrawaddy, the construction of a deep-sea port at Bhamo in Kachin State, 
the highest navigable point on the Irrawaddy; and the construction of a road 
from Bhamo to China.  
It should also not be overlooked that the SPDC leadership ostensibly 
used its natural resources and geographical position as diplomatic cards to 
bring China to tone down even its private criticisms of and advice to the 
military junta. In September 2007, for instance, China had played an im-
portant part in accomplishing the UNSG Special Envoy’s visit to Yangon in 
the aftermath of the suppression of the so-called Saffron Revolution. How-
ever, Myanmar’s military leadership seemingly became increasingly irritated 
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with China’s diplomacy, especially as Beijing seemed content to sanction a 
briefing on Myanmar by UNSG Special Envoy Gambari at the 2007 East 
Asia Summit in support of ASEAN’s more critical approach and tone vis-à-
vis Naypyidaw at the time. In response, the junta may have delayed until the 
end of 2009 the aforementioned agreement on the crude oil pipeline on 
which Kunming and Beijing were keen (The Irrawaddy 2010). By some ac-
counts (Aung Linn Htut 2011) General Than Shwe even signalled to Beijing 
his reluctance to accept the proposed starting point of the crude pipeline 
route, apparently in view of Chinese suggestions that Myanmar should pur-
sue a more inclusive political process, as reportedly again put to Than Shwe 
by the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi in December 2008. A delay also 
ensued in the two sides moving forward with the railway project close to the 
pipelines. These illustrations would indicate that the SPDC generally sought 
to maintain a firm hand on sensitive issues and perhaps even demonstrated a 
certain prickliness in dealings with China, their need for diplomatic protec-
tion notwithstanding. Overall, however, they also show that the SPDC re-
gime played various available cards in efforts to maximise the return for its 
natural resources and its agreement to enhance China-Myanmar intercon-
nectivity. 
Relations with Armed Ethnic Groups 
The SPDC found it a serious irritant that among the armed ethnic groups in 
the Sino-Myanmar frontier region are ex-CPB forces with longstanding 
personal, social and business cross-border links that tend to complicate the 
military’s tasks of national re-consolidation and continued state building 
(Callahan 2007). The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest ethnic 
army to emerge from the CPB’s collapse in 1989, posed a particular chal-
lenge in this regard given its military strength and staunch commitment to 
securing a higher degree of autonomy than the SPDC was prepared to offer.  
Among Myanmar’s military, the relationships of the UWSA and other 
ceasefire groups with various Chinese authorities led to the perception that 
the PRC ‘maintains a balance of power between border ethnic groups and 
the military government to ensure that neither side gains the upper hand’ 
(ICG 2009: 10). Chinese analysts (Li and Lye 2009; Li 2010) have suggested 
that Myanmar’s military worried that China would be able to draw on its 
contacts with the armed ethnic nationalities to cause problems should bilat-
eral relations deteriorate, notwithstanding the PRC’s position according to 
which China’s central government does not maintain formal relations or 
official contacts with any armed militias in Myanmar; indeed, the suggestion 
is that there is no formal recognition, military support, exchanges or eco-
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nomic assistance to these groups. That said, PRC citizens have reportedly 
been enlisted by the armed ethnic minority groups as technical experts or 
mercenaries (Li and Lye 2009: 275). Also, research conducted by the Inter-
national Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that Wa weapons have partially been 
sourced via ‘rogue elements’ within the PLA. According to Black and Davies 
(2008), weapons acquired by the UWSA include howitzers, field artillery, 
anti-aircraft artillery and surface to air missiles, such as HN-5 MANPADS. 
Although the Wa served the Tatmadaw as a quasi-ally against the Shan State 
Army (SSA)-South and were allowed to build up a formidable presence 
along the Myanmar-Thai border, the military regime registered in the 2000s 
considerable discomfort with the Wa’s devolved existence, their appreciable 
territorial hold and apparent military potency.  
A fuller study of the various exchanges and interactions between My-
anmar’s military and PRC interlocutors on the question of how to manage 
the conflict between Naypyidaw and the armed ethnic groups has yet to be 
undertaken. That said, Chinese authorities not only do not appear to have 
been at all keen to see the Tatmadaw engage in military operations against 
ethnic nationalities along the border, but also probably saw little need during 
most of the SPDC years to influence leaderships in the Kokang, Wa and 
Mongla special regions to make them reach a political compromise with the 
Myanmar military leadership. In contrast, for the Than Shwe regime talking 
to China regarding these issues assumed growing significance after the pro-
posed new Constitution was accepted in a problematic referendum in May 
2008. After all, the regime’s original ambition was to see Myanmar’s ethnic 
ceasefire groups disarm before the coming into force of the new constitu-
tion, which was to happen with the convening of parliament following elec-
tions announced for 2010. Then General Shwe Mann, during a visit to Bei-
jing in June 2008, reportedly requested the Chinese government to convince 
the armed ethnic groups on the Sino-Myanmar border to surrender their 
weapons.  
The issue was apparently again raised in December 2008 when Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi visited Myanmar (ICG 2009: 11). According to the 
ICG, the Chinese authorities responded by encouraging the ethnic militias 
to discuss the terms of the regime’s Border Guard Force proposal, primarily 
to avoid the spectre of forceful disarmament of the ethnic armies (ICG 2010: 
4). This proposal, put forward in April 2009, was designed to achieve greater 
congruence between the constitutional provision whereby there is to be only 
one Myanmar military and the reality of multiple armies operating inde-
pendently of one another within the country’s borders. At the same time, 
Chinese interlocutors apparently also urged the SPDC to desist from armed 
confrontation, while possibly also suggesting that Naypyidaw might want to 
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consider offering the armed ethnic groups a greater degree of autonomy in 
practice. Such a position, it seems, was communicated to General Maung 
Aye, when he visited China in June 2009. In other words, Beijing appears to 
have called for dialogue and compromise (ICG 2009: 13, ft 127) without 
however simultaneously applying much pressure on the armed ethnic groups, 
although both Naypyidaw and the ethnic groups in question had up to that 
point clearly failed to demonstrate a willingness to compromise. In the event, 
some smaller ethnic ceasefire groups would accept BGF-status, but the 
majority of armed ethnic armies operating close to the border with China 
refused to entertain the idea of Tatmadaw control over their armed forces, 
including the main ex-CPB armies. It was in this context that Naypyidaw 
employed force to eject Kokang’s leadership.  
In August 2009, Myanmar’s security forces, reportedly acting on a tip 
off from a Chinese official (Zaw Myint 2009), moved against a weapons 
factory in Kokang and targeted the premises of then Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) chairman Peng Jiasheng. According 
to local observers, the ensuing standoff was soon followed by military clash-
es involving members of the MNDAA, supported by other ethnic armies, as 
well as the Tatmadaw, backed by local allies.17 The use of force marked the 
first time since 1989 that a ceasefire was unambiguously broken along the 
Sino-Myanmar border. In the event, the Tatmadaw quickly established con-
trol of the Kokang capital of Laogai, and MNDAA soldiers as well as its 
chairman reportedly fled to China. Peng’s deputy, Bai Suoqian, who was 
more favourably disposed to Naypyidaw’s border guard forces proposal, 
replaced him heading the pro-junta Kokang Region Provisional Leading 
Committee.  
From China’s perspective, this police and military intervention seriously 
undermined stability and security on the border, not least because it report-
edly resulted in 37,000 refugees temporarily crossing into Yunnan, the 
deaths of two Chinese citizens and widespread damage to ethnic Chinese 
economic interests in the Kokang region (Wai Moe 2009; Jagan 2009b). It 
was classified a level-1 incident, the highest possible among emergency con-
tingencies, requiring unified leadership from the State Council (Thompson 
2009). To deal with the situation, Beijing dispatched Meng Jianzhu (Minister 
for Public Security) and General Chen Bingde (the PLA Chief of Staff) to 
the border. Several hundred PLA troops were also deployed (Jagan 2009a). 
Apparently, China’s authorities had not been informed about the raid be-
forehand. While some outraged Chinese nationalists and bloggers called for 
17  Approximately 26 soldiers and police force members were killed on the Myanmar 
side.  
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the retaking of Kokang by force of arms, the Chinese authorities essentially 
opted for some straight talking with Naypyidaw about the need to prevent a 
reoccurrence, although Chinese officials also asked for compensation for 
damages incurred in the violence. While Myanmar’s military leadership 
agreed on the importance of border stability, Chinese leaders have made the 
latter a focal point of bilateral ties. For instance, maintaining peace and sta-
bility on the border was one of four tasks identified by Beijing for improving 
bilateral relations, as put forward by Vice-President Xi Jinping, when visiting 
Myanmar at the end of 2009 (Xinhua 2009). Premier Wen Jiabao also 
broached the issue when he travelled to Naypyidaw in June 2010 to cele-
brate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Myanmar diplomatic 
relations. 
The Kokang incident represents an interesting facet of bilateral ties. It 
demonstrated the SPDC’s preparedness to take the risk of irritating its chief 
diplomatic partner in the pursuit of its core domestic agenda. It of course 
also signalled both to other armed ethnic groups and Beijing that its hand 
would not be tied forever by the apparent preference of Chinese authorities 
to leave the situation along the border unchanged. This seems to have 
forced Beijing to reconsider whether China should continue its hands off 
approach and perhaps still even rely on the ethnic nationalities as de facto 
buffers for possible leverage over Myanmar. According to the ICG (2010: 3), 
Chinese officials reassessed as destabilising the uncompromising stance 
towards Naypyidaw adopted by the ethnic political-military leaderships. This 
has seemingly led to Beijing assuming more proactive facilitation if not me-
diation efforts to influence the armed ethnic groups concerned to reach a 
settlement with Naypyidaw. China’s interest in border stability and the safety 
of Chinese nationals reflects the increasing levels of investment in Myanmar. 
At issue is not only pipeline security, but a swath of projects, including con-
troversial ones, in major industries such as hydropower. As further cease-
fires between government forces and armed ethnic groups threatened to 
collapse in early 2011, Chinese behind the scenes involvement continued.  
In short, Myanmar’s limited alignment with the PRC did not prevent 
the SPDC from defending and asserting vis-à-vis Beijing a robust position 
concerning the armed ethnic groups. Indeed, when the opportunity arose, 
the SPDC did not shy away from escalating the conflict with ethnic Chinese 
forces despite the risk of antagonising PRC leaders. It is likely that taking 
such a risk proved easier to take in a changing political context in which the 
Obama administration was moving toward a policy of pragmatic engage-
ment. Nevertheless, the broader handling of the Kokang incident suggests 
that the SPDC was clearly happy to signal not only its disapproval of the 
political and military status quo in the frontier region, but also its disgrun-
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tlement with perceived Chinese ambiguity on the issue. Such a stance should 
not normally be expected from a lesser state that depends on a major power 
for support. In this case, a rattled Beijing has been guided in its response by 
the realities of economic interdependence and its strategic interests. The last 
section will briefly assess whether the nature of Myanmar’s alignment is 
changing in the nominally civilian administration that succeeded the SPDC.  
Towards Tighter Alignment? 
Incoming President U Thein Sein in his inaugural address to the newly 
formed parliament committed Myanmar to a nonaligned, independent and 
active foreign policy (NLM 2011a). Notably, however, China now appears 
intent on securing a tighter political embrace than was characteristic of the 
SPDC era. Having already offered a firm endorsement of Myanmar’s politi-
cal process in the lead-up to the 2010 elections, Beijing’s support for the 
new government in Naypyidaw has been quite emphatic. Within three days 
of the new government assuming office, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the Na-
tional Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference and one 
of the highest ranking members of the CCP Politbureau Standing Commit-
tee, visited Myanmar, as the first foreign leader (Xinhua 2011a, b). Against 
the backdrop of the breakdown of a further ceasefire, involving units of the 
Shan State Army-North, Jia’s visit carried the message that China expected 
Myanmar to safeguard stability in border regions. However, suggesting that 
Beijing and Naypyidaw were heading toward closer alignment, it was also 
declared that bilateral ties had reached a strategic level.  
In May, General Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission, became the first senior foreign military leader to visit 
Naypyidaw following the formation of the new government. During this 
visit Naypyidaw not only reaffirmed existing pillars of bilateral ties, but also 
indicated its preparedness to strengthen relations with Beijing. President U 
Thein Sein, for example, affirmed ‘Myanmar will abide by the ‘one China’ 
policy no matter how the international situation changes’ (Xinhua 2011c). 
Moreover, Myanmar’s host, General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-
Chief of Myanmar’s Defence Services, agreed with Xu’s proposals to en-
hance mutual strategic trust, strengthen links between the PLA and Tatma-
daw and pursue practical cooperation. Heading a large delegation, President 
U Thein Sein then travelled to Beijing in late May 2011. In the initial meet-
ing with Jia Qinglin, he reportedly (Xinhua 2011d) thanked the latter for his 
‘valuable advice on developing bilateral relations.’ More importantly in sub-
stantive terms was that the two sides issued a joint statement on the estab-
lishment of a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership based on the 
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Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Even before U Thein Sein’s visit, 
China’s ambassador to Myanmar had referred as a ‘new breakthrough’ to 
this joint statement (quoted in Zhang 2011), which outlines agreement on 
continued high-level contacts and exchanges, consultations between foreign 
ministry officials as well as timely exchanges and regular meetings to rein-
force strategic communication. It also highlights agreement on issues that 
have in the past been of concern to the People’s Republic, such as more 
efforts to create a favourable environment for trade and investment and 
improved business ties as well as to ‘conduct timely communication on 
border management affairs, and strive to maintain peace, tranquility and 
stability in border areas.’18 As such, Myanmar leadership was ready to com-
mit in a politically binding statement to a good number of the points that 
Chinese officials have put forward in past years. At the same time, it is not 
clear to what extent Naypyidaw has agreed to substantively alter defence and 
security cooperation.  
This is notable because Thein Sein’s first official visit to China as in-
coming President took place against the backdrop of speculation that Beijing 
was keen to secure both regular access to Myanmar ports for PLA (Navy) 
vessels and provide naval protection for future sensitive physical infrastruc-
ture in the Bay of Bengal (Wai Moe 2011). Although the bilateral relation-
ship was upgraded to a ‘cooperative comprehensive strategic partnership’, 
neither the joint statement on the bilateral relationship nor other official 
releases made explicit mention of the issue. If the PRC has indeed ap-
proached Naypyidaw regarding improved port access arrangements, the 
Thein Sein government is clearly aware of and careful about the signals that 
access provision and closer defence cooperation are likely to send. In that 
sense, the President seemed intent on maintaining Myanmar’s independent 
foreign policy.  
That said, the official New Light of Myanmar (NLM 2011c) did indicate 
that Myanmar ‘fully supports China for reconstitution of the UN and South 
China Sea issues.’ One question the first point raises is whether this implies 
Myanmar aligning its position with China concerning UN Security Council 
reform, especially the question of permanent membership. Beijing support-
ed neither Japan’s nor India’s moves for a permanent seat in the past. In the 
case of Japan, this is due to what some would call ‘historical baggage’, in the 
case of India, Beijing’s lack of support has been said to follow from New 
Delhi linking its bid with Japan in the G4 group of nations (Krishnan 2011). 
As one of the BRICS states, China has more recently indicated it does ‘un-
18   Joint Statement between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the People’s 
Republic of China on establishing a comprehensive strategic cooperative partner-
ship, Beijing, 27 May 2011.  
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derstand and support’ India’s aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.19 
Myanmar in the past failed to support Japan’s bid (in contrast to several 
other ASEAN countries), but publicly endorsed India’s. Given China’s re-
cent limited endorsement of a greater UN role for India, Naypyidaw’s sup-
porting remarks do not equate to a departure from its previous position or 
its independent foreign policy more generally.  
The question is whether Naypyidaw’s expression for support on the 
South China Sea is qualitatively different. Myanmar was not previously 
known for publicly offering such support. Also, the remarks were released at 
a time when ASEAN claimants and the wider region articulated concern 
about perceived Chinese ambition, intransigence and strong-arm tactics 
concerning the South China Sea. Indeed, Naypidaw’s support was made 
public as China and the claimant ASEAN states were at loggerheads in ne-
gotiations to produce concrete guidelines to implement the 2002 Declara-
tion on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Consequently, apart 
from highlighting ASEAN’s intramural fissures, it might be possible to see 
Naypyidaw’s position on the South China Sea as a quid pro quo for Chinese 
support, perhaps specifically for China’s support of Myanmar assuming the 
ASEAN chairmanship in 2014 (Htet Aung 2011). Certainly, China’s en-
dorsement of Myanmar’s ambition to assume the ASEAN chairmanship is 
politically important for the Thein Sein government as even ASEAN by the 
summer of 2011 remained hesitant to offer its definitive backing on the 
issue. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s position on the South China Sea is vague. 
For what aspect exactly is it that Myanmar fully supports? Presumably the 
expression of support does not imply that Naypyidaw agrees with Beijing’s 
territorial claims as one would also not expect Naypyidaw to side with the 
various arguments of ASEAN claimants. If the support is given for an ap-
plication of general principles espoused by China (and others) to address the 
South China Sea issues Myanmar’s stated commitment to an independent 
foreign policy is not affected.  
Deeper levels of security and perhaps defence cooperation with China 
may be unavoidable over the longer run, however. After all, the PRC’s offi-
cial investments in Myanmar are increasing rapidly (the cumulative invest-
ment was put at USD 15.5 billion at the end of March 2011, after reaching 
USD 12.3 billion by the end of 2010). Some of these are rapidly moving into 
their operational phase, such as the biggest cooperative mining project be-
tween China and Myanmar, the Myanmar Taguang Taung Nickel Ore Pro-
ject Mining System. Significantly, China will want to protect in future major 
19  Sanya Declaration of the BRICS Leaders Meeting, Hainan, 14 April 2011, online: 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/14/c_13829453.htm>. 
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strategic ally important infrastructure, such as the gas and crude oil pipe-
lines. 20  However, this will not necessarily transform Myanmar’s limited 
alignment with China into tighter alignment. Indeed, given that Myanmar’s 
overall security situation is improving, the new government will probably 
not need to depend as before on the kind of military assistance and diplo-
matic protection that China provided in the past. Moreover, insofar as the 
government perceives security challenges in the emerging strategic context 
Naypyidaw may consider and take forward limited alignments with other 
countries. Whether such alignments would transpire or develop will primari-
ly depend on whether there are relevant promises and expectations under-
pinning these relations.  
For now, a series of diplomatic moves and domestic developments un-
derline Myanmar’s intention to foster better relations with major powers 
other than China. Concerning relations with New Delhi, for instance, the 
Myanmar government recently again offered visiting Indian External Affairs 
Minister S.M. Krishna ‘firm assurances’ that Naypyidaw would not allow the 
frontier region to be used by insurgents to launch attacks against India 
(Wade 2011). Although momentum does not compare well with that of 
Sino-Myanmar relations, the two sides remain committed to pursue imple-
mentation of agreed projects that will promote economic development on 
both sides of the border (e.g. Kaladan project). Naypyidaw is also exploring 
possibilities in relations with Japan, now that Tokyo’s Myanmar policy is 
liberated from the longtime restraint of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house 
arrest. Most significantly, following the installation of U Thein Sein as presi-
dent, Myanmar has demonstrated continued eagerness to move forward 
relations with Washington. Dialogue involving senior officials was resumed, 
with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun travelling to Nay-
pyidaw in May 2011.  
Myanmar government’s hopes for better relations were also communi-
cated to Senator John McCain just days after U Thein Sein visited Beijing. 
Achieving these is not straightforward, however. Foreign Minister U Winna 
Maung Lwin called for a relationship based on ‘equality and mutual respect’, 
while Washington has voiced disappointment with Myanmar’s political pro-
gress since the Obama administration revised its Burma policy to pragmatic 
engagement. Notably, however, the political-military leadership has visibly 
worked to change domestic and international perceptions of the incumbent 
government. After advising repeatedly that the NLD might wish to register 
the party and stand for elections, Daw Suu Kyi was allowed to travel outside 
20  In April 2011, Myanmar Railways and China Railway Engineering Corporation 
signed a MoU on the construction of the Muse-Lashio-Kyaukpyu railroad; initially, 
the focus will be on linking Muse and Lashio in Shan State (NLM 2011b: 1, 7). 
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Yangon without incident. The government also restarted a dialogue with her 
that has included a meeting with President U Thein Sein in August 2011. 
Even before then, Myanmar’s new government sought to address US con-
cerns about its apparent nuclear intent. Myanmar also formally clarified that 
it was not going ahead with the purchase of a nuclear research reactor from 
Russia (NLM 2011d). It has moreover sought to dispel doubts and concerns 
about the cargo of vessels suspected of carrying cargo from North Korea to 
Myanmar in breach of UNSC-mandated sanctions. Though even a quite 
limited alignment between Myanmar and US seems distant for now, the 
trajectory of developments in Hanoi-Washington relations suggests such an 
arrangement is eventually possible under certain conditions.  
Conclusion 
Drawing on the wider alignment literature, this article has discussed the 
nature and management of Myanmar’s alignment with China. This align-
ment, which primarily involved China’s promise and the SLORC/SPDC’s 
expectation of diplomatic protection, was an obvious choice for the incom-
ing military regime given the lack of other external sources of support avail-
able. Notably, it remained limited throughout SLORC/SPDC rule even as 
security pressures by the United States increased over time, especially during 
the time in office of President George W. Bush. The article explained this by 
referring to the commitment to an independent foreign and security policy 
that has been at the core of Burma/Myanmar’s foreign policy practice since 
independence; a commitment reinforced by a strong and pervasive sense of 
nationalism within the military, and past interaction with China. In managing 
this alignment over the last decade, the SPDC arguably ‘rewarded’ Beijing 
for its diplomatic support and protection, primarily by making available to 
the PRC a significant part of Myanmar’s natural resources and by allowing 
Chinese state-owned companies to construct strategically important physical 
infrastructure connecting Yunnan with the Bay of Bengal.  
However, the argument submitted here is that when agreeing to these 
large-scale projects with China, the regime in effect opted only for those 
schemes that stand to foster greater interdependence, generate ample funds 
for Myanmar’s coffers in the future, and perhaps even have the potential, 
from the military’s perspective, to draw the country closer together in the 
protracted pursuit of state and nation building. As such, the SPDC clearly 
sought to manage its limited alignment with China based on the principle of 
mutual gain, while avoiding a surrender of political autonomy. Indeed, it is 
notable that in acting on its political-security imperative to unify the country, 
the SPDC, as the Kokang Incident suggests, was even prepared to shock 
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Beijing into recalibrating its position on the conflict between the military 
and various armed ethnic groups along the Sino-Myanmar border. The My-
anmar case thus shows that lesser powers can obtain security benefits from a 
major power without this necessarily requiring more than limited alignment 
or entailing a serious erosion of political autonomy, particularly when the 
former possesses valuable natural resources and enjoys considerable geo-
strategic significance for the latter.  
That said, given China’s preparedness thereafter to play a more con-
structive behind the scenes role that seems designed to transform over time 
the ceasefires along the border into viable peace arrangements, as well as 
Myanmar’s rapidly increasing economic and infrastructure ties with its 
northern neighbour, decision-makers in Beijing may hope for more wide-
ranging security cooperation in part given the need to protect Chinese inter-
ests in Myanmar. The nature of the two countries’ alignment is unlikely to 
change in the post-SPDC era, however. Certainly so far, the new ostensibly 
civilian government has stayed the course of Myanmar’s independent for-
eign policy. With seemingly more earnest domestic political change now 
under way, Naypyidaw is also likely to improve relations with the United 
States, thereby lessening political-security pressures and reducing the need 
for diplomatic reliance on China. Indeed, better relations with Western 
countries may just be what Myanmar’s leadership now wants to balance its 
burgeoning relations with the PRC.  
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